c) EDUCATION

As with the clinics in the region, the Afghanaid team found that all government madrassas (mosque schools) had also suffered badly at the hands of the local mujahideen. In many cases we heard of all the teaching staff being murdered by local villagers. There were many such incidents during the early days of the Jihad.

The team were shown a large school in Upper Or which was now totally deserted. The building was still in a good condition and there would be no reason why at the end of hostilities it should not be re-used. Most villages with a reasonably large population had a locally organised madrassa. The standard of education unfortunately can, at best, be described as basic, with usually only the Koran being taught to the very young children. There seems to be a generally held view in most of the liberated regions within Afghanistan that education should be limited to religious studies. Although this does much to instil in the children good Moslem beliefs, it does not prepare them for further education.

The lack of higher education will eventually mean a huge shortage of everyone from electricians to teachers in years to come. It may be indicative of the way future policy will be fashioned by a coalition government or hopefully it is just a sign of the troubled times that most educated people who might have served as teachers have either been arrested by the government, murdered by the mujahideen or have simply fled to Iran and Pakistan.

When the team asked the village maliks (headmen) what their main problems were only two included the lack of education. This may be explained by the fact that most of our questions related to agricultural problems, but it still shows in the two cases (Hasanabad and Dihak Bala) that education is low on the list of priorities.

When Senator was interviewed he did express the wish that help could be given to schools. The team said that on their return to Pakistan they would suggest that Afghanaid should try and contact some of the western education committees for help in this matter.

The team would recommend that the now disused schools in Kalay Konar and Or Bala might be re-opened when refugees return in significant numbers. In the short term any assistance with providing existing madrassas with school books, stationery, blackboards, etc would be gratefully received.

d) AVAILABILITY OF GOODS AND SERVICES

All of the information relating to the availability of services and goods came from the village maliks or from the lists of goods available in the bazaars in Ziken and Anardara. (See Appendix C)

The majority of the population in the region the team surveyed were farmers who were still able to eke out a living from their land. They were often self-sufficient in food and rarely had to buy in such things as meat or vegetables. The only goods they bought in from outside were such things as tea, sugar, kerosene and cloth. These were either bought in the main bazaars in Zeiken and Anardara or, in the case of villages such as Hassanabad and Tapei Hisar, from traders who visit the outlying villages by tractor.

Most basic foodstuffs seemed to be available in the larger bazaars which buy their supplies from Farah and Herat. As can be seen from the lists of goods available in the bazaars, the war has not affected the flow of supplies to and from the major cities. Carpet manufacturing still seems to be flourishing in towns like Anardara, with the finished carpets being bought by traders who in turn sell them in Kandahar for export to Germany. As with other areas of Afghanistan, inflation has had its effect on prices.

e) AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK

Land in General.

It was soon apparent to the team that the agricultural land in both the Qalay Qar and Anardara regions had been very badly affected by the war. A combination of ground and air attacks have destoyed many of the pumps that had been established in the region during Daoud's time. It seems that the Government had targeted the water supply in an effort to drive out as many of the local population as possilble and in so doing hinder the local mujahideen. These attacks not only destroyed the diesel pumps, but effectively destroyed the whole agricultural system. Without the steady supply of water that the pumps produced, the irrigation canals (karez) became redundant and soon began to fall into disrepair. Needless to say, without a ready supply of water, it soon became impossible for many farmers to continue working their land. This, along with the steadily worsening security situation, forced a large proportion of the farmers to move their families to Iran.

The lengthy absence of a large proportion of the agricultural labour supply has meant that karez in the area, which have to be maintained each year in order to keep them free of silt, have in many places become blocked up. The very nature of the soil in the area also speeds up this silting process.

Approximate percentage of land now farmed.

These figures show the approximate percentage of cultivable land now farmed alongside figures of the present population (shown as a percentage of the pre-war population of the village).

VILLAGE	% LAND FARMED	% POPULATION
RANGI	35	50
KHOJAR	33	75
KALAY KONAR	30	25
HASANABAD	40	20
SARAK QALA	10	50
DASHTAK	25	50
DOZDABAD	25	7
SAMAK KHAJAN	10	0
TANGAK QALA	5	10
PADOW	2.5	12
LOWER AND UPPER OR	0	0
KAREZAK	33	50
SECHA	33	62
SADAKA	33	50
PADAS	40	35
ZIKEN	10	20

Main crops.

Where farming still continued in the region covered by the survey, the main crops seen in the fields were wheat, maize and cotton. In the village of Secha which had what was described as ' high land ' ie land with deep soil, the ratio of wheat seed sown to that harvested was 1:40. Because of the lack of cultivable land, there has been a marked decrease in the amount of surplus grain that can be sold at the market place. One of the few cash crops is cotton which in villages such as Geng is exchanged for consumer goods such as cloth, tea and sugar in Anardara.

The main reason given by maliks for not cultivating their land was the lack of irrigation, seed, fertilizer, tractors or oxen and labour.

Other crops.

The majority of larger villages also grew vegetables and fuit. Vegetables grown included pulses (dahl and lentils), tomatoes, egg- plant, carrots, turnips, onions, peppers and baghli. These were in the most part grown for home consumption and, as with wheat, there was little if any sold out of the villages.

The region has always been a famous fruit-growing area with towns like Upper Or and more importantly Anardara (Anar = Pomegranate in Farsi) having large mulberry, pomegranate and anob (a small, nut like fruit) orchards. These have been abandoned in many villages because of the lack of labour to tend them. The lack of water in some of the gardens has caused the death of many of the fruit-bearing trees. In Upper Or, the only returning refugee the team came across had taken on the task of watering the trees in the various orchards in the village. He had been able to save some but many had already died and in future a great deal of replanting will be necessary if the region is again to become a large fruit-producing region.

Irrigation, wells and water pumps.

As stated earlier, the irrigation ditches in the whole of this region have been seriously affected not only by the Government attacks but more importantly by the loss of labour. The Government in the early years of the war either destroyed water pumps by bombing, as in the case of the one in Padow, or dismantled them, as in the case of the one in Tapei Hisar. Of the ones they left alone, few are now in working order as spares have been inpossible to get hold of. Of fourteen villages visited in the Qalah Qa region that had pumps prior to the war, twelve had lost the use of them either through action by the Government or through lack of spares. It is easy to see why food production is so low even in the villages that still have a relatively large population.

The team were able to take notes of the type of pumps that were being used in the villages and also the main mechanical faults that prevented them from working (see the village profiles in the Annex to the Report)

The team recommend that, if a follow up monitoring team is sent to the region, it should include a water engineer with knowledge of water pumps. There were some questions raised by the Afghanaid Project Manager as to the advisability

of replacing existing water pumps. It was felt that if too many were used, there might be a danger of lowering the water table in the region, as has happened in the past in Baluchistan. This, the team felt, was a possibility even though the water table is very high in the region. One possibility could be to investigate alternative forms of pumping water to the surface. As can be seen in the village profiles the region has seen the use of wind-powered mills and we feel sure there must be the technology available to install easily-maintained wind-pumps. It may prove difficult to get farmers who have in the past been used to diesel pumps to change to using the new style pumps, but hopefully the economics will justify the change.

The team had been briefed in Peshawar to expect major problems with the irrigation systems in Farah. However, we had not expected the massive collapse of the karez system that had actually occurred in the area. We saw large tracts of what had been cultivated land slowly returning to semi-desert. It was soon decided that all the money that had been allocated to the region should be spent on a large scale karez-cleaning programme using where possible refugee labourers who would be brought in from the camps in Iran. They would work, again where possible, on their own village karez alongside the villagers who had remained.

Livestock.

The numbers of livestock at present in the area are at Appendix A.

Although these figures do not give a complete record of livestock numbers in the region, it is possible to get a reasonably accurate picture of how the numbers of livestock have been affected by the war and the movement of the population.

An example of how drastically the livestock numbers have been reduced in the area can be seen in the village of Khojar. The village's pre-war population of eighty families is now sixty. However, the number of goats and sheep the village owns has been cut from fifteen hundred to two hundred. Even allowing for the number of cattle and goats that the refugee families would have taken with them to Iran, this reduction in the herds is extremely high.

The team were told that the reasons for the drop in numbers were:-

1) the result of bombing; 2) foraging by government forces; 3) supplying local mujahideen groups with meat; 4) villages being forced to sell higher numbers on the open market; and finally, 5) natural wastage through local consumption.

Although many villages have lost a large percentage of their flocks, many still have relatively large flocks which are the mainstay of the very fragile economy.

Tractors.

By referring to the figures in Appendix A, it can be seen that although a number of villages still had tractors, only two out of twelve were actually working. The others had either been destroyed or taken by the Government or the villagers were unable to get spares for those that had broken down.

The loss of these tractors has significantly decreased the amount of land the farmers are able to cultivate. For the most part, the farmers have reverted to using oxen to plough their fields.

The team were asked in Peshawar to explore the possibilities of getting a village to contribute up to half the cost of buying a new tractor with the balance being met by Afghanaid. Unfortunately, where we did make this proposal it was rejected out of hand, the maliks saying they could not afford it.

The forms of ownership of tractors varied from village to village. The majority of tractors were owned by individual farmers who were also maliks. In Hassanabad, there had been four or five tractors which had been owned jointly by between one to two hundred men in the village. Each co-owner contributed towards the running of them with two individuals responsible for servicing them.

Where villages did not own their own machines, they were often able to hire them (Hojaisan , Musa Kalay from Anardara and Samak Khaja from Secha). Rates for hiring them varied from 120 to 140 Afs.

f) RESULTS OF PREVIOUS AID TO WESTERN FARAH

As was mentioned earlier in the introduction to this report, Senator had received Pak Rs 305,000 in February 1988. One of the team's tasks during our visit to the region was to try and assess how effectively this had been used. Unfortunately, the team were not briefed on the amount of cash that had previously been sent to the region and because of this it was impossible to gauge how effective it had been.

The first village which we visited that had received money from Senator was Chasendar. Here the malik had been given 12,500 Afs four months ago for karez cleaning. All of the money, along with some of the malik's own, was spent on cleaning a stretch which we were told took 30 minutes to walk (approx 2 km). Labourers came from the village and also from the camps in Iran to carry out the work. Between one and two hundred men were used and were paid 200 Afs per day worked; the work took 50 days to complete.

We inspected the work that had been carried out and found that a substantial amount had been done, extending out as far as the village of Musorgh Alli.

In the village of Khojar, the malik had been given 50,000 Afs which had, he claimed, been stolen by Commander Majon Khan after Senator had left the area for Iran. He felt that in order to clean the two miles of karez in the village a further 100,000 Afs would be needed.

Kalay Konar had received 10,000 Afs again for karez cleaning. The malik had organised fifteen men to start cleaning the two kilometres of karez. They had managed to clean one hundred metres of the canal in the fifteen days they worked on it.

In Musa Kalay, the villagers had used the 12,500 Afs given to them to clean 500 metres of their karez. Fifty men had been employed for twenty days at 250 Afs per day.

Hasanabad was given 10,000 Afs and were able to clean a 1 km stretch of their 10 kms of channels. Their labourers were paid 300 Afs per day.

Sarak village had been given 10,000 Afs for karez work. The labourers had managed to clean forty percent of the karez system. For this they were paid 200 Afs per day.

Samak received 15,000 Afs and cleaned approximately 1 mile of karez.

In Tangak, the 25,000 Afs had been used not for karez cleaning but to build a horse-powered water lift whch replaced the original diesel pump. The landowner had spent a further grant of 40,000 Afs on buying two horses which were used to power the lift.

Padow was given 10,000 Afs and used it to clean over half of the village's karez.

Anjiran cleaned between 6 and 7,000 metres. The work, which was supervised by the village malik, took approximately 54 days and six men were employed at 500

Afs per day. This was the highest daily rate of pay the team came across in the region.

Upper Or was one of the larger villages in the Qalay Qar region and was also one that had suffered badly from Government bombing. Senator had given 125,000 Afs to finance the cleaning of the karez that watered the fruit gardens. It was hoped that refugees would be encouraged to return to the village once this work had been completed.

The eleven villages the team visited had received a total of 314,000 Afs. Senator claimed that other villages which we were not able to see had also received grants but as he had not been told to keep accounts of payments made, it is impossible for the team to verify this. All that can be said is that of the Pak Rs 305,000 given to the region, the team only saw evidence of about one tenth of it having been spent. This does not necessarily mean that the rest had not been used for the intended purpose; the team had asked to see only a sample number of villages and were not able to visit Jija.

In conclusion, the team were able to confirm that a proportion of the previous aid had in fact reached the villages and had been put to good use. The way the money was allocated in some cases left a lot to be desired. The case of the one farmer who had received a total of 65,000 Afs is a case in point. The need for an administration in the region to oversee the work and to pay the labourers is clearly the first priority.

g) POPULATIONS AND REFUGEES.

Details of the present and pre-war populations in the villages of the region are at Appendix B.

Movement of refugees to Iran.

From these figures it is possible to say that approximately 79% of the villagers from the villages visited by the team had fled across the border to Iran.

This breaks down as follows:-

Qalah Qa Woleswali: Pre-war population 5,240; present population 404; number of refugees 4,836 or 92.3% of the pre-war population.

Anardara Woleswali: Pre-war population 3,740; present population 1,613; number of refugees 2,217 or 59% of the pre-war population.

Although the team felt that in some cases some of the pre-war population figures seemed to be somewhat high, it was felt that the overall percentage figures are about right and prove that there has been a massive shift in the population since the beginning of the war.

The movement of refugees is still continuing across to Iran. After the bombing of Anardara, families were seen moving towards the border. Also, while the team were on the border vehicles and camels were daily seen ferrying groups westwards.

Unlike certain parts of Eastern Afghanistan, there was little evidence of members of families returning to farm their land during the planting and harvest seasons. The only evidence of movement was of individual families crossing the border to visit their friends and families in the refugee camps.

The situation in the refugee camps in Iran is very different from those in Pakistan. The authorities provide nothing in the way of rations or health care as found in Pakistan. The refugees are expected to fend for themselves in every way, from finding work to organising basic health clinics. For the latter, help is given by the parties who send trained para-medics from Pakistan to work in the camps.

There appears to be no love lost between the mujahideen and the Iranians, especially the border police. The team were told of a number of incidents where the police had harassed and on some occasions arrested refugees and mujahid who were attempting to cross the frontier. The harassment has come in various forms. Both food and money have been confiscated from travellers both on entering and leaving the country. Bribing border guards is often the only way both genuine refugees and mujahid can obtain entry permits. Senator himself had been arrested in the past and had only been released when some of his men attacked one of the border posts and held a number of its guards hostage.

The Iranian authorities can exert enormous pressure on individual commanders by simply refusing them permission to travel freely backwards and forwards into Iran. In a move to try and circumvent this, the group we accompanied had for the first time travelled through Afghanistan to reach their command centre rather than risk being stopped travelling along the previously used route that took them through Iran. This subject is described further in the Security section of the report.

Although the information gathered by the team indicates that the refugees are experiencing difficulties in the camps, it must also be said that camps offer an extremely attractive alternative to life in the war-torn areas they have been forced to leave behind. The camps have organised their own clinics and schools. Many of the men have found work, often in the construction industry which is a forte with Afghans. Refugee farmers, who cannot by law own their own land, have in many cases been able to rent land from Iranian farmers and farm on a sharecropping basis. Wages are nearly always far higher than can be expected in Afghanistan.

It is against this background that any possible return of refugees either permanently or just in the short term to work on karez cleaning projects must be looked at. It soon became apparent when talking to Senator that Afghanaid could not expect workers to return to their villages without paying them a wage higher than was normal for the type of work in that region. We were told that although this rate (400 Afs per day) was lower than that received in Iran, it was understandably higher than the local rates. These tended to be on average around 250 Afs per day.

Considering that these workers would, where possible, be working in their own villages, we at first felt that they should be willing to accept a lower rate. However, as most of them would still have to support their families in the camps who would have to continue to pay for food at Iranian prices, we had to agree to the maximum wage of 400 Afs.

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h) SECURITY

There are always problems with security in Pakistan and Afghanistan and they should be seen against the background of an ever-changing political and economic situation.

The first problem that we encountered was that our minder, Zarif, advised us against making contact with the Harakat office in Quetta in order to get letters of introduction to the commanders at Sharafat Khoe. The idea was that we should seek out their agents in Quetta without alerting the man in charge of the office as to our programme. This was a tall order, especially as our interpreter had only been hired 3 days before and had not been given any security briefing whatsoever. Quite innocently he made several gaffes before we got the message across. It meant that we were entirely in the hands of our hosts, who may or may not have wanted to prevent us from establishing cross-party links.

Having spent 3 nights in Quetta, the message came that we were to move to Gerde Jangal as the caravan was ready to depart for Farah. It turned out that we had to spend a week there. They had sensibly selected a house in a small cluster about 10 minutes drive from the centre of the camp area. We visited the bazaar twice to have baths at the hammam and needless to say this attracted some attention. Some of our escort could not keep their mouths shut and were actually overheard telling the curious that we were on our way to Farah.

There were no problems at the 3 militia posts between Gerde Jangal and the border.

Once inside Afghanistan our physical security was ensured by the large convoy (5 trucks) we travelled with. For our men, this was a new route and from Marja onwards they had to hire guides. They selected this route in order to avoid the western road which hugs the border and actually goes through Iran at Robat. The Iranians used to take the opportunity to count their weapons and even confiscate them, using their control over the refugee camps as leverage. Much later, we heard another reason for taking a different road. The 2 Gaz 66 trucks used by our men had been seized from drug smugglers and allocated by Jamiat to Senator. Juma Khan wanted to avoid meeting their previous owners. Drug dealers operate all along the western border of Afghanistan and we heard that they process opium at Gerde Jangal.

En route we met various commanders and other travellers. This is inevitable and indeed part of our job. We were as vague as possible when asked where we were going but cannot answer for our friends.

Senator's karargar (headquarters) at Shandi Lashgar is the worst possible place to spend a discreet week or so. There are half a dozen other karargars in the immediate vicinity, some actually semi-detached. A main trade route into Iran passes by the front door. In the course of a week we were taken to see all the neighbours and dined with several of them. It was thus inevitable that the Iranian 'inspectors' should hear about us. They visited twice that week and we spent several hours locked in our hut. They knew all about us, even that we were very big men, in fact huge, and they would just like to have a chat with us. Our visit coincided with that of a Jamiat inspector (checking weapon

numbers) and he and our interpreter were produced as the only strangers in the camp. The Iranians were not convinced. They were said to be assisted by 10 Hesbi Islami mujahideen seconded to them by Raufi Rahimi, the local Hesbi Islami (Gulbuddin) commander. He gets blamed for everything.

The journey from Shandi Lashgar to the project area was haunted by men on motorbikes who were said to be spies.

While working in the area, we had no real security problems, apart from our escort. They deemed it necessary to bring 2 lorries with approximately 60 mujahideen festooned with weapons to protect us. We felt and said that this was excessive. A large entourage tends to intimidate villagers. However, on a first visit to the area, we were prepared to go along with their assessment of the threat. That there was a threat was confirmed by the bombing of Anardara and Ziken on 3-11-88, increased helicopter activity over the Markaz during our presence in the area and subsequent bombing and shelling of villages and towns. In the future, the Government will hardly be able to make such a nuisance of themselves.

In the years to come, security problems will probably centre on criminal activity (drugs, kidnappers, etc.) and the possibility of unwittingly offending against the Pashtoon code. Monitors will need armed bodyguards for some time to come. In this regard, the team always felt safe with Senator's men and really did believe that they would protect us to the end. The laws of hospitality are rigidly observed in this part of the country. More cynically,a monitor is of value to those to whom he brings benefits.

To summarize:

- Most of our security problems were caused by our hosts. This can be explained by lack of experience.

- The briefing of commanders such as Senator must cover all aspects of security.

- Afghanaid should build up a permanent corps of interpreters and not hire people at the last minute. These people should be properly trained both in the skills of translating (perhaps they should be referred to as translators) and made to understand thoroughly the need for good security.

8) POSSIBLE AID OPPORTUNITIES

Housing

As mentioned earlier in the report, the team did not feel that aid for house reconstruction was a priority in this region. Although there is massive destruction in many of the villages, many families would be able to survive initially in the houses which have withstood the worst of the bombing. This will no doubt sound a harsh conclusion to draw but it is one backed up by a number of village maliks who felt that reconstruction came well down the list of priorities in the region. Once water is made available again, most villages we came across have the knowledge and skills to restore and rebuild their houses.

Health.

This is one area which the team felt must be high on the list of priorities for future assistance to this region. Apart from the government clinics which are rarely if ever used by people living outside the Woleswalis (district headquarters), there are no nurses let alone doctors working in the area covered by the survey.

Without a basic system of health care, it is going to be difficult to persuade refugees to return from the camps in Iran. The team would recommend that one of the Peshawar-based cross-border medical agencies be informed of the situation that exists in Farah in an attempt to encourage at least one medical team to go to the area.

Education

It is difficult to see in the present situation how we would be able to improve the educational system that exists in Farah. The majority of educated men that would have filled positions of teachers have either been killed by the government or the mujahideen or have moved across the border. Help in the form of teaching materials in the larger towns of Ziken and Anardara would, we are sure, be gratefully received but as with medical assistance, this falls outside the scope of Afghanaid and again we feel that assistance from the educational committees must be enlisted.

Agriculture.

We hope that we have been able to show how the farming in Western Farah has been affected by the prolonged war. The combination of Government attacks and the loss of valuable labour has meant that the area, which was once a rich agricultural region, is hardly able to support the reduced population that have remained behind.

The team were able to see how previous cash inputs have helped those farmers that have chosen to remain and we feel sure that the money the team took with them on this occasion will go some way towards easing the problems of returning

refugees. If, however, more assistance is not forthcoming from Western agencies it is hard to see how refugees will be able to survive in the harsh environment that exists in this region.

It is difficult to know where to start when it comes to drawing up a list of priorities for aid in agriculture. We felt that water related projects must be at the top of the list. The region needs assistance to continue the irrigation cleaning that has already begun in Senator's area of influence. Thought must also be directed towards the problems of water pumps and tractors, without which it is difficult to imagine how the land will be able to support even a small increase in the region's present population.

9) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It soon becomes obvious to anybody reading this Report that the area covered by it has suffered very badly since the start of the war. The complete agricultural framework of what was a rich farming region has been affected and even with massive outside assistance, any recovery will take a long time. This, of course, can be said of the whole of Afghanistan but, unlike many other areas which have for some time been receiving aid from foreign aid organisations, we were the first monitoring team to visit Farah.

The area has suffered worst from attacks made on its sources of water. The pumps and the wells from which the pumps take their water had all been attacked by the Government at some time during the war. The resulting loss of water has been the main reason for the movement of refugees to Iran rather than the security problems. Eighty percent of the pre-war population in Western Farah is estimated to have left the region.

With the refugees have gone many of the doctors, teachers and potential administrators leaving the area bereft of the sort of people they desperately need. It is difficult to see how this region will be able to pick up the pieces once the war finally ends and some form of government is established.

The team soon established through its discussions with the village maliks that the main problems facing the area were a lack of water and a need for medical assistance. With the first, the team was able to help but not with the second as it was outside Afghanaid's scope.

As far as the water problem is concerned, the team allocated the whole of the funds made available to it to continuing the karez-cleaning programme which Senator had started using a previous 'cash for work' grant. Because the team were unsure of Senator's ability to administer such a project, we did not sign any further agreements which we had been authorised to do by the Peshawar office. We felt that it would be more prudent to use the project as a testing ground for Senator's administration. It was made clear to Senator on numerous occasions that if either the work or the accounts were not completed to Afghanaid's satisfaction it would be unlikely that he would receive any further aid.

To administer the aid provided, the team agreed with Senator that he would bring in two educated members of his group, SAED MALUK son of MOHD YASIN and AHMAD son of JUMMA, to oversee the work personally. They would record the names of each worker employed and any payments made to them in an accounts book provided by the team. They were also to write a report on each karez cleaned, recorded again in a book provided by the team, with details such as its overall length, depth and width, the length cleaned and the number of workers used in its cleaning. Senator agreed to make these records available either to Afghanaid in Peshawar or to any follow-up monitoring team that visits the region.

With these records, it was hoped that Senator would have no excuse to claim later that he did not understand what was expected of him. The team feel that he must be given a chance to prove himself and if the follow-up team find that the work has been carried out satisfactorily, then we would recommend that further grants should be made available to him.

APPENDIX A.

LIVESTOCK.

The following information on livestock has been extracted from the 'VILLAGE PROFILES'(see Annex to the Report).

VILLAGE	POP (families)	OXEN	COWS	SHEEP/GOATS	HORSES/DONKEYS		TRACTORS
HOJAISAN	12	4	-	-	-	-	-
DAWSAK	10	8	-	10/11	-	-	1(destroyed)
KAREZNOW	10	4/5	-	1/200	-	yes	-
HASSANABAD	20	12	-	yes	-	-	4/5
RUNGI	15	5	-	yes	-	-	-
FATIABAD	10	4	30	yes	-		2 (broken)
CHASENDAR	20	12	50	yes	-	-	1 (")
KHOJAR	60	8	15/20	200(1500before)		-	-
KALAY KONAR	15	0	1	12 (a)	-	-	-
MUSA KALAY	35	2	6/7	150(500 before)		-	- rent.
HASANABAD	20	4	15	2/300		-	-
SARAK QALAH	30	10	20	300	-	-	-
DASHTAK	5	10	50/60	400	-	-	-
UPPER DIHAK	10	4	10	150		10	1 taken.
GENG	20	6(24)	15/16	250	-	-	-
SAMAK KHAJA	0	-	1	4/5	1	1	- rents.
TANGAK	4	-	1	1	2	-	-
PADOW QALAH	5	2	4(3 calves)	50	-	-	2 Destroyed.
ANJIRAN	6	1	2	30	-	-	-
UPPER OR	(a)	-	-	-	-	-	-
LOWER OR	(")	-	-	-	-	-	-
KAREZAK	50	8	10	500	-	-	-
SECHA	25	0	20	1500	1	-	2
SADAKA	100	10	20	1000		20/25	2 broken
PADAS	13	3	4/5	60	-	-	-
ZIKEN	300	0(100)	-	450(1500)	-	-	- hire
ANARDARA	1200	?	2500	2000	-	-	-

KEY. (500) Numbers before war.

(a) In the villages of Lower and Upper Or, we were told the two villages owned between them before the war some 3/400 oxen and approximately 5500 sheep and goats. These had either been killed in bombing, eaten or stolen by the Government.

APPENDIX B.

POPULATION.

VILLAGE	TRIBES	P/W POP	PRESENT	% REFUGEES
HOJAISAN	?	33	12	63
DAWSAK	?	30	10	66
KAREZNOW	BO. t.	1000	10	90
HASSANABAD	BO. a. t. tim	300	20	93
TAPEI HASAR	BO. g	16	5	69
BESHIRI	BO	250	1	99.6
RANGI	?	500	15	97
FATIABAD	?	20	10	50
CHASENDAR	BA	50	20	60
KHOJAR	N. S	80	60	25
KALAY KONAR	S	60	15	75
SARAK	Sam	60	30	50
MALBOLAKH		21	1	95
HASSANABAD	???	100	20	80
ARAGHAR	???	60	30	50
DASHTAK	S. T	10	5	50
DOZDABAD	Sam	300	40	93
UPPER DIHAK	T	20	10	50
GENG	B, T, Sam	150	20	87
KHUSHKHAK	???	600	10	98
SAMAK KHAJA	???	15	0	100
TANGAK	S	35	4	89
PADAW	???	40	5	88
ANJIRAN	T, D, M	60	6	90
BALA	N, T	1000	0	100
LOWER ORE	N	350	0	100
KAREZAK	N	100	50	50
SECHA	S, t	40	25	38
SADACAR	N	200	100	50
PADAS	A	40	13	65
ZIKEN	T	1500	300	80
ANARDARA	N, t.	2000	1200	40

KEY TO TRIBES (Capital letter denotes major tribe):-

N = NORZAI, T = TAJIK A = ARAB

S = SAYED, TIM = TIMURI D = DARAGI

Sam = SAMZAI G = GEST M = MAR

BA = BARUKZAI B = BALUCH BO = BOUMEDI

APPENDIX C.

PRICES OF GOODS

COSTS OF GOODS DISPLAYED IN ZIAUDDIN'S SHOP

ZIKEN 3.11.88.

ITEM	WEIGHT/NUMBER	COST (AFs)
Russian washing powder	1 Pack	40
Richmond Cigarettes	1 Carton	700
Camel tyre patches		350
Energile Tonic	1 Pack	40
Gold Cell 1.5 V batteries	"	1200
Shampoo	1 bottle	90
Torch, small		100
Hair clips		140
Comb	1	10
Arcoroc glasses	4	340
Chinese vest	1	130
Head gasket for Gaz	1	1400
Kiwi boot polish	1 tin	140
Wool for carpets	1 Kg	700
Chinese Kerosene stove	1	1400
Plastic sandals	1 pair	120

FOOD ITEMS

Dried tomatoe	1 Kg	160
Wheat for flour	"	200
Sweets	"	140
Bubble gum	1 pack	4
Toffees	½ Kg	200

PRICES OF GOODS IN SHER AHMED'S SHOP, ANARDARA.
4.11.88.

ITEM	WEIGHT/NUMBER	COST (AFs)
FOOD ITEMS		
Tea	1 Kg	500
Sugar	"	120
Pomegranates	"	20
Wool	"	200
Rice	"	100
Almonds	"	150
Tea, Iranian	½ Kg	150
Cooking Oil	17 Kgs	3700
Apricot pips	1 Kg	100
Sweets	"	130
Dried mulberries	"	20
OTHER ITEMS		
Richmond cigarettes	1 carton	600
Tea pot	1	350
Womens shawl	1	200
Galvanized bucket	1	400
Hair dye	1 bottle	500
Lukus soap	1 bar	50
Lux powder	1 packet	150
Naswar tin	1	30
Washing powder	1 packet	50
Razor blades	5	40
Hand towel	1	40
Water jerry can	1	200
Stainless steel tray	1	600

AVERAGE COST OF FOOD STUFFS RECORDED IN THE QALAH KAR AREA

ITEM	WEIGHT/NUMBER	COST (AFs)
Black tea	1Kg	620
Sugar	"	130
Sweets	"	180
Meat, Goat/Mutton	"	375
Rice	"	650
Wheat seed	"	40
Eggs	"	10
Ghee	16Kg	5000
Sheep	Small	5000
"	Large	10000
Goats	Small	5000
"	Large	10000
Cows		45000
Chickens	Small	6500
"	Large	1000

TRAVEL COSTS FROM QALEH KAH TO THE IRANIAN BORDER

The cost for one man to travel to Iran and back by car was 12,500 Afs. To hire a complete vehicle for the same return trip was 125,000 Afs.

DAILY RATES FOR LABOURERS IN THE REGION

The rates for labourers varied from 250 Afs per day in Chasendar to 350 per day in Padow Qala. This gave an average rate of 300 Afs per day in the region.

1) INTRODUCTION

Afghanaid's monitoring team for Farah spent sixty days travelling inside Afghanistan with fourteen days spent on the border and travelling to and from Peshawar to the border. The team, which consisted of two monitors, one translator and two Afghan field workers, left Peshawar on 8th October and returned on 20th December, 1988.

2) PROJECT OBJECTIVE

The trip's objective was to travel to the province of Farah and survey the areas under the control of Senator (Shir Ahmed), Hagi Mohammed Shah and Hagi Ghullam Rassoul. In these areas, the team was to try to assess the possibility of Afghanaid providing minimal or extensive emergency assistance or rehabilitation programmes.

The team aimed also to:- a) Assess the command structure within the areas and determine if an administration existed through which Afghanaid could work effectively; b) Assess the different problems from which the region was suffering and determine what, if any, should be Afghanaid's contribution; c) Set up in the area of Qalah Qah an initial programme with a budget of Pak Rs 500,000; d) Set up a programme with the Pak Rs 100,000 that we took in with us for each of the areas controlled by Hagi Mohammed Shah and Hagi Ghullam Rassoul; e) Monitor the previous programmes in these areas and assess their effectiveness.

3) PREVIOUS PROGRAMMES

During the latter part of 1987 and the early part of 1988, the commanders in two of the project areas had received sums of money from Afghanaid. These grants were to be used to finance cash for food and cash for work programmes. Senator, the commander for Western Qalah Qah, had received Pak Rs 305,000 in February 1988. He had requested this sum be made available to enable him to initiate a karez (canal) cleaning project.

In the second area, commanded by Hagi Mohammed Shah, a grant of Afs 450,000 had been made available for a cash for food programme.

Following these inputs of cash it was decided that a monitoring team should be sent to report not only on the effectiveness of this aid but also to gather information on the overall situation that existed in the region. Up until the time the team left Pakistan, no other Western agricultural agency had operated in this area of Farah. It was hoped that as a result of the team's findings, further large scale development projects would be initiated in the region.

APPENDIX D

COMMANDERS AND GROUPS.

Information on other Commanders/groups

1)

Haji Malik Nazar, son of Abdur Rahman.
Chakap village, Farah Rud, Farah w/w.
Local commander. Jamiat Islami.
Our host at Gerde Jangal, where he now lives full-time. Elderly. 2 out of 3 sons shahid (martyrs).

2)

Khazi Abdul Wahab.
Kalauis village, Helmand velayet.
Officer of Hazarat. Aid agency attached to Jamiat H.Q., Jangal & Chagai.

3)

Maulavi Abdullah Had, son of Abdul Hamid.
Tolgizer, Chardarra w/w., Kunduz velayet.
Jamiat, Chagai.
Was headmaster of Islamic school (1304 pupils in 12 schools. Up to 7th class-pre war). Speaks good English but rather shifty.

4)

Mohammed Sharif.
Elderly. Jamiat.
Commander of 20-30 men Chakansur w/w., near Khash Rud, Nimruz. Markaz Sarilob.

5)

Haji Ataullah, son of Haji Abdullah.
Jamiat. Karargar Hazrat Ali, Enjin w/w., Herat.

6)

Commander Hakim Khan, son of Ghulam Shah Khan.
Jamiat.'American City', Marja, Nad i Ali w/w., Helmand.
Gave us lunch 19-10-88.

7)

Commander Bari Dat, son of Haji Fatah Mohammed.
Jamiat. Markaz Falatch, Helmand.

8)

Jalat Khan, son of Ghulam Khan.
Jamiat.Comdr. Chanjir w/w.,Helmand.

9)

Commander Shir Ali.
Jamiat. Farah Markaz.

10)

Haji Abdur Razak.
Jamiat. Karargar Hazrat Omar, Shandi Lashgar, Nimruz.
Holding militia families prisoner.

11)

Commander Boriddin Khan.
Jamiat.
Jabba Khoe Abdaru, Qala Q'a w/w., Farah.

12)

Noor Ahmad Jan.
Jamiat. Padaw village.
A holy man who wields a lot of influence in the Qala Q'a area.

13)

Abdul Kayoum, commander, belongs to Senator's base at Shandi Lashgar. Son of Abdul Nabi, Qala Q'a.

14)

Mohammed Naib, son of Mahmad Ayub.
Jamiat, Shandi Lashgar.

15)

Commander Wazir Khan
Elder brother of Juma Khan & Senator. Tank-killer and hero of the battle of Surkhash. A very simple and decent man.

16)

Haji Juma Khan (no relation to above).
Jamiat. Commander and malik of Ziken, Anardara w/w., Farah.

17)

Amanullah.
Jamiat. Rais Jija, Haq Safed, Farah province.
A cheery soul with a repertoire of puns, puzzles & party tricks.

18)

Habibullah.
Jamiat. Commander Jija.
Knows about mills and machinery.

19)

Abdullah. Brother of above.
Co-commander Jija.

20)

Chance interview.
19-10-88
At Garm Seer. Interviewee Hoshkiar Sayeb, Ittehad commander.
All parties represented in area.
Inhabitants all now refugees, only Cochi (nomads) in area (not borne out by our observations). Last attacked 17 days ago but Soviets repulsed.
Mujahideen have taken 22 posts. Nearest post Marja (we had lunch there)
Tribes: Nurzai, Isakzai, Laghmani, Barukzai.
Problems: Irrigation (waterpump).
Tractors.
Clothes.
Nearest doctor Pakistan.
No fertilizer.
1 madrassa, not divided into classes.

Cattle farming and wheat/maize are the mainstay of local farming.

Names of woluswali & Helmand commanders:

Matoo Khan	Ittehad Islami
Sidirki	Harakat Inqelab
Haji Abdul Rachman	N.I.F.A.
Noor Yahya Khan	Hesbi Islami Gulbuddin.
Amir Kayoum	Harakat
Hakim Khan	Jamiat i Islami.
Noor Sadat	Hesbi Islami Gulbuddin.
Sultan Mohammed	Hesbi Islami Younes Khales.
Rachmatia	Hesbi Islami Gulbuddin.

They have received no aid in the past.

4) SUMMARY.

1. The team travelled by vehicle from the Pakistan border to the Farah area and back without too much difficulty, taking 3-4 days over each trip.

2. Security was lax and there was evidence from bombing attacks on places they had visited and attempts by Iranians from over the border to locate them that their movements were known and watched. Future monitors should continue to have armed guards.

3. They spent some 10 days travelling in the area under the control of Senator, the main Resistance leader in the region. They were unable to visit the two other areas not under his control, being put off on various pretexts, and did not therefore hand over the Rs.100,000 intended for those areas.

4. They found what had been a rich farming region seriously affected by the war, with an estimated 80% of the civilian population having fled to refugee camps across the border in Iran, only on average 30% of the cultivable land being farmed and the bulk of the livestock having been lost.

5. The main reason for the exodus of refugees and for the lack of cultivation is the collapse of the irrigation system due to the destruction of water-pumps and wells and the silting up of the karez (canal) network. Only such land as still has water available can be cultivated and until the irrigation system has been repaired it will not be possible to bring further land under cultivation to support the returning refugees. Water is a pre-requisite for any other form of agricultural aid.

6. The team therefore decided to devote the whole sum of Rs.500,000 to karez-cleaning, using paid labour from the refugee camps in Iran, and they agreed with Senator the procedure for carrying out this programme and for furnishing proper accounts.

7. The other needs of the area are health clinics and schools. House-rebuilding is not a major problem, since all houses in the area are made of mud-bricks and most people are able to do the work themselves.

8. There was evidence that at least some of the grant made to Senator earlier in 1988 for karez-cleaning had been effectively used for that purpose, but there remain some doubts about Senator's ability to carry out the larger programme proposed. It was made clear to him that further aid would depend on satisfactory completion of this programme.

9. The team recommend that a follow-up mission should go to Farah in the Spring to see how the work is progressing; the mission should include at least one European monitor and a water engineer. Decisions on future aid to Farah should depend on the report of this mission.

5) ITINERARY

The monitors left Peshawar by air on the 8th October, 1988, going via Islamabad and Lahore to Quetta which they reached that evening. The rest of the team, interpreter Amanullah Seerat Turkestani, minder Zarif and driver Abdel Wahed, the two latter provided by Senator as temporary Afghanaid field-workers, drove down to Quetta in an Afghanaid ambulance. They arrived on the 9th October,having left on the 7th.

We stayed in Quetta until the 11th. The monitors lived at the Save The Children (U.S.) staffhouse through the kindness of Sultan A. Aziz, the director. He would not accept any recompense. The others stayed at Shee's Hotel.

At dawn on the morning of the 11th. the team left Quetta for Gerde Jangal refugee camp, North East of Dalbandin, about 5 hours drive from Quetta. The police and tribal militia posts are at their most relaxed during the daytime - at night they look out for smugglers.

We languished for a week at Gerde Jangal waiting for Juma Khan, Senator's elder brother and deputy commander, to assemble his caravan. We feel that this was most unwise from a security point of view and that many of our later troubles stemmed from this long stay in a camp full of smugglers, nosy gossips, etc. It was also very boring. We stayed at the house of Haji Malik Nazar, one of a small group of houses well away from the main camps.

Before first light on the morning of the 18th, we moved to a Jamiat arms depot, said to be near Baramcha. The caravan collected us and we left at about 1600 hrs. No problems were forthcoming at the 3 posts on the way to the border although it is hard to believe that the Baluch militiamen did not spot the 2 Europeans.

Emerging from the Chagai Hills our 6 vehicle convoy pressed on over the desert in a roughly N.N.E. direction. There were many halts for punctures and one of Juma Khan's Gaz 66 trucks had carburettor problems so the caravan was very strung out. We met many other vehicles going in both directions. At about 0200 hours we reached a large irrigation canal (part of the Lashkar Gah scheme) and followed it for a while before crossing by a good bridge and halting for a couple of hour's rest at 0400 hrs. This place was called Garm Seer.

Dogged by endless breakdowns we reached the Markaz (occupied by mujahideen) of Hazar Juft and crossed the Helmand river by a good single carriageway bridge. A wide smooth dirt road led from here to Marja where we stopped for a late lunch with Commander Hakim Khan (Jamiat). With some haggling over the extortionate fee we took on a guide and left Marja in the late afternoon. At this point our caravan was reduced to our vehicle and Juma Khan's 2 Gaz trucks. We were now traversing the Dasht i Margo. In the small hours, we reached the Khash Rud area and encountered several mujahideen posts whose policy was to shoot first and then talk about it. At one point, we were all set for serious confrontation but half an hour of argument averted it. At Dewalak, we stopped and were given tea and bread by the local Jamiat supporters before moving off - in the wrong direction as it turned out. Luckily, after about an hour, an old man appeared from nowhere to say that the road ahead was mined. Juma Khan was so disconcerted by this that, to our great relief, he decided to sleep where we were halted.

After first prayers on the 20th, we moved due West, picking up another guide at Razai. About the middle of the day, we crossed the 'Nimruz Road' and arrived at the village of Allili, guarded by some trigger happy Baluch. 2-3 miles further we stopped for tea at the village of Awar. A Baluch from Allili agreed to guide us on the last leg of the journey.

At dusk we came to a broad body of water, probably the Hamun-i-Helmand and followed the northern shore westwards. Lights to the South and West were said to be in Iran. We stopped for tea at Dan Rud and spent a couple of hours asleep at an Ittehad Islami kerarghar (headquarters) at Cheraki.

Before midday we reached Senator's kararghar at Shandi Lashgar, fondly believed by its occupants to be in Farah Province but located by us using back bearings just South of the provincial border in Nimruz.

Survey Itinerary

We left Shandi Lashgar on the morning of the 27th October and moved to the valley west of Qala Q'a via Dam Dam and Cha Sheikh, passing to the north of the old post at Koh Pal. Through Joy'chuna and Tapeisa we arrived at Hojeisan where we spent the night.

28-10-88
Hojaisan, Dawshak, Kareznow, Koh Pal, Hassanabad, Tapei Hisar, Rungi and Fatiabad. Spent night at Chasendar.

29-10-88
Chasendar, Khojar, Matbagh, Kalay Kunar, Musa Kalay. Spent night at Hasanabad (do not confuse with Hassanabad).

30-10-88
Hasanabad, Sarak, Charni (old Government Commissary and H.Q. of border guards), Dihak Bala, Geng, Samak Khaja, Tangak. Slept at Anjiran.

31-10-88
Padaw, Anjiran, Or Bala, Or Pine. Slept at Anjiran.

1-11-88
Kareznow, Karezak, Secha. Slept at Sadaka.

2-11-88
Sadaka, Padas, Ziken, Gurgak. Spent night lost in desert en route to Kohe Abdaru.

3-11-88
Kohe Abdaru, Ziken. Slept in Anardara.

4-11-88
Anardara, Sadaka. Slept at Anjiran.

5-11-88
Anjiran, Hojeisan, Cha Sheikh, Dam Dam. Slept on south side of Kohe Asparan.

6-11-88
Kohe Asparan, Shandi Lashgar where we were to remain until 13-12 88.

Return Itinerary

13-12-88
Shandi Lashgar, Dam Bulle, Faizabad, Basirjew (deserted), Basirjew (occupied) where we slept in the house of a Baluch. We travelled in a 9 vehicle Ittehad Islami caravan.

14-12-88
Basirjew, Dozabad, Siah Cha (desert), Lalu(desert), ford W of Khwaja Ali. Spent night on N. bank of Helmand river.

15-12-88
Khwaja Ali, crossed river which took most of day, old Government buildings at Deshu. Slept at Gul Zeri.

16-12-88
Gul Zeri, Luri, Galacha, Baramcha, crossed border. Slept on roadside near Ahmad Khan Camp.

17-12-88
Ahmad Khan Camp, Achundi, Gerde Jangal, Quetta.

The monitors and interpreter flew via Islamabad to Peshawar on 20-12-88. The rest of the team brought our vehicle up by lorry, arriving on 22-12-88.

6) DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT AREA

Much of the area we saw is desert, mostly shand (gravel & sand), but there are areas of irrigated land and also parts where the water is so near the surface that scrub grows in profusion. Nearly all the rivers marked on the Swedish map are dry and flood only in an exceptional year. Water abounds from 2-10M below the surface. The only place in the project area where we saw water flowing unaided was in Anardara. In some places, particularly around Shandi Lashgar, there is heavy salinity, with a crust of salt on the surface of stream-beds. We wondered if this might form the basis of a salt industry in the future.

The ranges of hills (the tail-end of the Hindu Kush) rise abruptly from the plain. The rock is very flaky & wonderfully stratified. Many of the mountains are said to contain a variety of minerals and precious stones. Before the Revolution, an American company is said to have made extensive surveys of the area. The Russians extracted some sort of mineral from the summit of Kohe Abdaru which was valuable enough to justify their shipping it out by helicopter (unless it was a freelance operation by a local commander).

In the valley west of Qala Q'a, the soil improves as one moves east. At first it is more or less sand but by the time Secha, N. of the Markaz, is reached, it is of good quality and deep enough for most requirements. It is significant that the richest landowner lives there.

Another pocket of good land is around the village of Sadaka where the karez system is in better shape than elsewhere.

The villages are built of mud bricks, but in the towns such as Ziken and Anardara there are substantial houses of stone and concrete, although the rendering is done with traditional mud plaster. Many of the houses have domed roofs which work very well in maintaining an even temperature summer and winter. Decorative ventilation holes are bricked up during the winter. Precious panes of glass are used to make small windows in guest rooms, sometimes old car windows, etc.

Many houses have walled gardens and orchards with intricate irrigation systems. Sheep and goats are penned at night, domestic animals such as hens range about the yards and into the houses and many people have pigeon lofts.

Roads are fairly awful as no work has been done on them but because it is dry most of the time they serve their purpose. The most comfortable way to travel is by motorcycle.

7) AFGHANAID'S SURVEY FINDINGS

a) HOUSING.

The type of housing construction the team saw in the region was of a mud brick with a mud rendering. There was no requirement for wood in the building of houses which would be an important factor when reconstruction begins at the end of hostilities. The use of mud bricks means that the only requirement for construction is water, labour and earth; the latter being available in vast quantities. No construction materials are needed to be imported and although there were teams of brick 'manufacturers' seen on the border who were exporting the finished product to the camps in Iran, it seems that most villages had the wherewithal to make their own. As to rebuilding, again in the villages where we asked, there always seemed to be people with the relevant knowledge.

The levels of destruction varied greatly from village to village. In the extreme cases such as Lower Or, which had been the centre of resistance in the region, all the houses had been deliberately destroyed by ground attack. This was an extreme case and we found that although most villages had suffered destruction of some sort during the hostilities none were uninhabitable. The very nature of the construction of the houses has made them very resilient to bombing with all but a direct hit being absorbed by the walls.

The one main drawback with mud constructed buildings is that after any period of rainfall measures have to taken to restore the exterior plaster. As with karez cleaning, this would normally be routinely carried out each year. However, because of the massive depopulation in the region this has not been done and has, in some villages, resulted in the erosion of the exterior plaster of many houses.

The team felt that if a gradual return of refugees was to take place, most families could probably make one or two rooms habitable in their houses while concentrating on reclaiming their agricultural land. Once this had been done, individual families could set about restoring their houses, all of which could be carried out by the villagers themselves.

b) HEALTH

From the numerous interviews that the team carried out in Western Farah, it is clear that the situation relating to health care is very bad. Before the war, there were clinics in all the Woleswali (administrative districts) and also in a few of the outlying villages such as Upper Or. Villagers requiring treatment would travel to these centres for treatment in the government-run clinics. Soon after the start of the war many of the outlying clinics were, like the schools, targets for the mujahideen who viewed any government organised establishments as being anti- Islamic and therefore to be removed along with all the nurses and doctors.

This process of destroying the clinics proved very effective in eradicating Communist influence in the villages but proved disastrous for local health care. The only clinics that are operating now in the area are those run by the government in Q Q Woleswali. As in other regions, the only people who use this clinic are the very old, the very young and the women. Even the old men are often afraid to travel to them as many are sympathetic with the mujahideen and believe they will be arrested on entering the government centres.


The only alternative left to the people now is to take their seriously wounded across the border. This not only requires a considerable outlay of cash, up to 125,000 Afs, but decreases the chances of the patient's survival in the more severe cases. The team came across one case where a wealthy landowner and malik was reluctant to take his son, who had suffered a serious gunshot wound to the hand, across the border for treatment. This he said was due to the expense the trip would involve. It was after a number of meetings with him to explain the seriousness of getting his son proper hospital treatment that he agreed, reluctantly, to take his son to hospital.

As the team moved further north, they came across a number of villages whose sick went to Anardara for treatment. We were told that there was a clinic here which dealt with minor injuries. On reaching the town we discovered the clinic was in fact only a medical store which dispensed basic pills, anti-biotics and dressings. The owner would also, for a fee, treat wounds and carry out minor first aid treatment.

One of the main requests made to the Afghanaid team in this area was for medical assistance and, in view of the pathetic medical cover, it is not difficult to support this request. The team came across no evidence of any Pakistan trained medics operating in the area from either within the mujahideen themselves or from outside aid organisations.

Afghanaid

FARAH
Autumn 1988



AFGHANAID: WHO WE ARE


Afghanaid is a voluntary British charity. It came into being in 1983 to respond to the distressed conditions of the civilian population within Afghanistan.

Initially, this was essentially emergency aid - mainly in the form of Cash-for-Food to poor families who had been identified as being in great need by the local 'jirga' or council.

At this stage, the aim was to help these people to remain in Afghanistan rather than becoming refugees in the already crowded camps in Pakistan and Iran.

The distribution of Afghanaid money and the authenticity of the needs were regularly checked out by carefully selected teams of British monitors. At the same time, they were collecting information as a basis for small-scale reconstruction and development programmes and discussing priorities with the local leaders. These projects aim to repair the damage inflicted on the villages and their lands by the war and to enable the refugees to return to their homes and reconstruct their shattered lives.

The British and American governments as well as UNHCR have contributed funds to Afghanaid on an emergency basis, but the work of reconstruction depends on voluntary donations by people who wish to help the ordinary people of Afghanistan to rebuild their lives in their own homes and villages.



WESTERN AFGHANISTAN

Monitors Route - - - →

0 50 100 150 km